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NEW ENVIRONMENT, OLD FEARS: THE SECURITY DILEMMA AND 
THE ABSENCE OF A PROHIBITION ON SPACE WEAPONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ‘Earthrise’ As Seen From the Moon By Astronauts of the Apollo 8 Mission (24 December 1968)1 
Executive Summary 
During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union demonstrated a shared 
interest in a military status quo in Earth orbit and exercised considerable restraint by not 
placing weapons in space.  
However, despite ever-increasing state dependency on civilian space applications, 
militarisation efforts have accelerated in recent decades, heightening fears that one or more 
states may deploy space weapons. Indeed, the catastrophic consequences of a space war 
appear to provide the world with an interest in keeping space conflict free but key space 
power states have been reluctant to implement a prohibition on weapons in space.  
To understand why, this paper analyses the history of space militarisation and arms 
control and the two most prominent explanations offered to date – that the United States has 
acted as a non-status quo state and that international governance has failed to deliver on its 
promise. Finding these unsatisfactory, the paper proposes that the absence of a space weapons 
prohibition is instead best understood as the product of security dilemma dynamics. These can 
lead even benign states with significant common interests to a self-reinforcing spiral of 
insecurity driven by uncertainty and fear. 
                                                 
1 Frank Borman (NASA), ‘Earth Rise’, photograph, 24 December 1968. Accessed 12 March 2013 at 
www.nasa.gov/multimedia/imagegallery/image_feature_102.html 
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Glossary 
ABM Treaty 
Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Systems, or Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
ASAT Anti-satellite weapon 
BMD[S] Ballistic Missile Defence [System] 
CBM Confidence Building Measure 
ESA European Space Agency 
EU European Union 
GEO Geostationary Orbit 
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System 
GPS [United States] Global Positioning System 
HEO High Earth Orbit 
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
ICOC  International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic 
Missile Proliferation  
ISR Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
ISS International Space Station 
LEO Low Earth Orbit 
Outer Space Treaty 
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 
PAROS 
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space 
(agenda item of the United Nations Conference on 
Disarmament) 
PPWT 
Draft 'Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of 
Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use 
of Force Against Outer Space Objects' 
SDI [United States] Space Defence Initiative 
SPACECOM [United States Air Force] Space Command 
SSA Space Situational Awareness 
SSN [United States] Space Surveillance Network 
TCBM Trust and Confidence Building Measure 
TMD Theatre Missile Defence 
UN United Nations 
USAF United States Air Force 
WMD Weapon(s) of mass destruction 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 “[T]he import of space to civilian, commercial and, in particular, military objectives, means that 
there is a great deal at stake in terms of the access to and control over Earth’s orbit. One cannot 
overstate this…point.” 
Francis MacDonald
2
 
 
When the USSR launched the world’s first satellite on 4 October 1957, it expanded the Cold 
War into Earth orbit and outer space became a key arena for competition between it and the US for 
prestige and influence. As Soviet and American spacecraft increased in both numbers and the 
variety of uses to which they could be put, it became clear that the space environment was one in 
which there was as yet no ‘rules of the game’. Over the next three decades, the superpower rivals 
made significant efforts to regulate space use; a number of multilateral treaties on space were 
established, principles for space governance agreed, and new international institutions set up to 
develop and oversee space governance. Space governance arrangements trumpeted the ‘peaceful’ 
uses of outer space, but few real restrictions were placed on states’ ability to utilise space for 
military purposes.  
This is striking as both the Soviet and American militaries made increasing use of space 
applications, and this ‘militarisation’ trend has only accelerated since the end of the Cold War. 
Satellite communications, navigation and imagery have increasingly supported 
intelligence-gathering and military operations on the ground. New military space technology has 
been developed, including anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) which, while never fired in anger, have 
now been tested by a number of countries. It should be noted that military uses were not solely 
offensive; satellites supported nuclear deterrence through providing early warning of launches and 
satellite imagery assisted the verification of strategic arms control agreements. 
                                                 
2
 Francis MacDonald, ‘Anti-Astropolitik – Outer Space and the Orbit of Geography’, Progress in Human Geography 
31(5):592-615 (2007), p.606 
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Calls for restrictions on military use of space accompanied this increasing military and 
civilian use of Earth orbit. In particular, many politicians and academics expressed concern at the 
prospect that the gradual and largely passive militarisation of space might cross a threshold into 
full-blown ‘weaponisation’, and that space would become the arena for a new and potentially 
catastrophic arms race. These fears have not disappeared with the end of the Cold War. Despite 
their rivalry, the US and USSR demonstrated a shared interest in a military status quo in space, 
largely avoided destructive escalation, cooperated on arms control measures, and exercised 
considerable restraint by not placing weapons in space.
3
 However, the increasingly congested 
nature of orbit and persistence of definitional issues in arms control efforts
4
 have highlighted 
growing potential for misunderstandings, competition and conflict in space.
5
  
Despite the seemingly pressing need and broad agreement by most commentators that it 
would be in the interests of all states, the world has never had a comprehensive legal regime 
prohibiting the weaponisation of space.
6
 The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States 
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (‘Outer 
Space Treaty’) of 1967, still the foundation of international space law, does ban the placement of 
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in space.
7
 However, it does not 
explicitly prohibit the deployment of non-WMD weapons in Earth orbit, terrestrially-launched 
ASATs, or the development, testing, production or storage of space weapons on Earth.
8
 A number 
of other treaties and anti-proliferation regimes do restrict some aspects of testing and deployment, 
                                                 
3 Nicholas Peter, ‘The Changing Geopolitics of Space Activities’, Space Policy 22:100-9 (2006), p.101; Nancy Gallagher, ‘Space 
Governance and International Cooperation’, Astropolitics 8:256-279 (2010), p.265 
4
 Columba Peoples, ‘The Securitization of Outer Space: Challenges for Arms Control’, Contemporary Security Policy 
32(1):76-98 (2011), p.78 
5
 Gallagher, p.260 and Kim Rathman, ‘Outer Space Commercialization and its Ethical Challenges to International Law 
and Policy’, Technology In Society 21:135-166 (1999) p.139 
6
 Tronchetti, Fabio: ‘Preventing the Weaponisation of Outer Space: Is a Chinese-Russian-European Common Approach 
Possible?’, Space Policy 27:81-88 (2011), p.88 
7
 Tronchetti, p.82 and Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 10 October 1967, Article 4 
8
 Outer Space Treaty, Article 3 
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but do not prohibit space weaponisation itself.
9
 Most recently, a 2008 joint proposal by China and 
Russia failed to establish a multilateral ‘Treaty on the Prevention of Weaponisation of Outer 
Space’10 (known as the PPWT) and the 2010 European Union ‘Code of Conduct for Outer Space 
Activities’ (EU Code of Conduct) is still to gain wide enough support to be considered to have 
changed the global situation.
11
 
This absence of a ban on space weapons leaves open the possibility of armed conflict in 
space.
12
 Such a conflict would have devastating consequences as most states and their populations 
are now critically reliant on space applications for everything from high-tech communications, 
finance and economic development to infrastructure planning and disaster response.
13
 As one 
author puts it, space “may hold few human targets but the capture or disruption of satellites could 
have far-reaching consequences for life on the ground”.14Adding to the potential impact of a space 
conflict is the risk of unintended consequences. Not only are satellite networks increasingly global 
in nature and interdependent, they also help to stabilise nuclear deterrence and their sudden 
disruption could increase the chance of nuclear war. Fears of weaponisation have increased 
following Chinese and American ASAT tests in 2007 and 2008 respectively, which many worried 
demonstrated these countries’ willingness and ability to deploy space weapons in future conflicts.15  
 The increasing military and civilian use of space applications, let alone the potentially 
catastrophic consequences of a space conflict, would appear to provide states with a clear interest in 
keeping space conflict free. However, key space power states have been historically reluctant to 
implement a prohibition on weapons in space. This begs the question of why. Academics have put 
                                                 
9
 Tronchetti, p.83 
10
 Tronchetti, p.84 
11
 Tronchetti, p.85 
12
 Jozef Goldblat, ‘Efforts to Control Arms in Outer Space’, Security Dialogue 34:103-108 (2003), p.108 
13
 Tronchetti, p. 81 
14
 MacDonald, p.600 
15
 Tronchetti, pp.81, 84 
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forward a number of different explanations, but inconsistencies, flaws and oversights in these leave 
them unsatisfactory. This paper attempts to further academic understanding of this issue, adopting 
as its research question “why have key space power states failed to agree on a regime that would 
prohibit space weapons?” 
The Politics of Space Weapons in Existing Literature 
The politics of space has generated a significant amount of academic literature. In fact, it is 
possibly more accurate to say literatures, as the diversity of interests in space and its governance 
has led to a number of different disciplines – including history, law, and science – generating their 
own research. Relevant literature includes multi-disciplinary assessments on the possibility and 
likelihood of an arms race in space and the policy priorities of key space power states, strategic 
assessments of the evolution of space technology, and legal works on the possible form of a legal 
weaponisation. Along with refereed political science journals
16
, relevant documentation includes 
the legal documents and UN General Assembly resolutions that form the core of international outer 
space law, public statements by space states,
17
 as well as information collected by international 
organisations and think tanks
18
. 
Commentators agree that a military dimension has always existed to interstate relations in 
outer space and that this dimension has become particularly critical to space power states since the 
first Gulf War.
19
 Indeed, many authors already consider space ‘militarised’ as space technologies 
                                                 
16
 For instance, these include Space Politics, Astropolitics, and Acta Astronomica 
17
 Happily, and in light of the author’s lack of Russian and Chinese language fluency, available literature contains a 
significant quantity of reliable information on Russian and Chinese space activities and the stances taken by these key 
space power states on arms control in space. 
18
 The most useful of these is probably the Space Security Index, the only annual comprehensive report on global space 
security trends and developments. Begun in 2003, the Index relies on input from over 130 space experts from 17 
countries in civil, commercial, and military space sectors. It can be accessed at www.spacesecurity.org. 
19
 M Cervino, S.Corradini and S.Davolio, ‘Is the “Peaceful Use” of Outer Space Being Ruled Out?’, Space Policy 
19:231-237 (2003), p.235; Alasdair McLean, ‘A New Era? Military Space Policy Enters the Mainstream’, Space Policy 
16:243-247 (2000) p.243-244; Nancy Gallagher and John Steinbruner, Reconsidering the Rules for Space Security, 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge (2008), p.23 
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have become vital to space powers’ military planning and operations.20 Existing literature on space 
militarisation has three main focuses. Firstly, many articles focus on the desirability or lack thereof 
of arms control in the space environment. Secondly, almost all authors recognise the importance of 
defining ‘militarisation’ and ‘weaponisation’ to establishing a meaningful prohibition, though this 
distinction can sometimes blinker authors to wider concerns.
21
 Third, there is considerable 
controversy over the question of whether the weaponisation of space is inevitable, why or why not, 
and the impact of this widely-held view on state efforts to prevent space weaponisation.
22
 
There are also differences of opinion in the literature regarding the requirements of a 
‘successful’ regime that prohibits space weaponisation. There is general agreement that a regime 
would need to secure the support of major space power states, clarify the ambiguity of 
weaponisation under current space law, and prohibit the research, development, production, storage 
and deployment of weapons regardless of their planned launching point or targets (ie. in Earth or in 
space).
23
 A key issue lies in how to ensure state support for a prohibition, especially in light of fears 
that legitimate defence interests might be impacted.
24
 Some argue that what is needed is a ‘soft law’ 
solution, namely a code of conduct along the lines of the 2010 EU Code of Conduct, to garner the 
greatest international support and to build norms.
25
 One author stresses the importance of 
establishing agreement between Russia, China and Europe as these states have been responsible for 
the most significant and recent initiatives while the US is unlikely to lead on the matter.
26
 Others 
point out that, as the country arguably most reliant upon space systems, the US “has a national 
                                                 
20
 Tronchetti, p.81; Columba Peoples, ‘Assuming the Inevitable? Overcoming the Inevitability of Outer Space 
Weaponization and Conflict’, Contemporary Security Policy 29(3):502-520 (2008), p.502 
21
 Columba Peoples, ‘The Growing Securitization of Outer Space’, Space Policy 26:205-8 (2010), p.76 
22
 Peoples, ‘The Growing “Securitization” of Outer Space’, p.205, McLean, p.246 
23
 Tronchetti, pp.81, 84 
24
 Tronchetti, pp.85-86 
25
 Tronchetti, p.81 
26
 Tronchetti, p.81 
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interest in keeping world commons secure”, even if there are currently voices there arguing that the 
“law is basically what the USA says it is”. 27  
 There are two particularly prominent lines of argument for the failure of key space power 
states to agree on a prohibition on space weapons. The first argument is that the US has acted as an 
offensive realist state and has simply never wanted such a prohibition. Proponents base their 
arguments on what they see as historically aggressive past behaviour, expansionist 
conceptualisations of national security that make compromise impossible, as well as repeated 
American rejections of space arms control initiatives. They also often draw on the fact that many 
‘space nationalists’28 among American scholars and policy-makers advocate aggressive policies that 
would increase US military space power.
29
  
The second main line of explanation argues that the absence of a ban on space weapons is 
due to failures of international governance in the face of rapid changes in the nature and scale of 
space use. In other words, the absence of a prohibition is due to the fact the right arrangements have 
not yet been proffered, not an absence of state willingness to consider proposals. Reflecting an 
institutionalist focus on norms, law and governance systems, this argument assumes that the proper 
institution of an international legal framework may reduce tensions and promote peace in outer 
space.
30
 It stresses the importance of multilateral space governance to providing states avenues for 
discussion, cooperation and dispute resolution.
31
 This line of explanation is the most optimistic; 
relevant articles argue that space applications and technology intrinsically encourage international 
                                                 
27
 Jonathan Galloway, ‘Game Theory and The Law And Policy of Outer Space’, Space Policy 20:87-90 (2004), p.88; 
McLean, p.247 
28
 Michael Krepon,‘Space: The Vulnerable Frontier’, Nonproliferation Review 15(3):549-554 (2008), p.554 
29
Gallagher, p.260; Jonathan Galloway, ‘Game Theory and The Law And Policy of Outer Space’, 
Space Policy 20:87-90 (2004), p.88-9. For example, influential American academic and military scholar Everett C. 
Dolman advocates the adoption of a geopolitical approach to space control, which he terms ‘Astropolitics’, in order to 
ensure US space supremacy. 
30
 Tronchetti 
31
 Rathman, p.161; C.Arévalo-Yepes et al, ‘The Need for a United Nations Space Policy’, Space Policy 26:3-8 (2010),  
p.5 
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cooperation,
32
 security on Earth is increasingly linked to peace in space,
33
 military power has 
increasingly less relevance between great power states,
34
 and that even the world’s most militarily 
powerful country, the US, cannot overcome its vulnerabilities in space through deploying space 
weapons
35
.  
The Security Dilemma as a Possible Explanation for Space Militarisation 
 This paper proposes a third explanation, namely that the history of space militarisation and 
of efforts to ban weaponisation is best seen as the product of a ‘security dilemma’, most famously  
explained by Robert Jervis as stemming from the fact that “many of the moves by which a state 
tries to increase its security decrease the security of others”.36 In this way, even benign states with 
significant interests in common can be drawn into a spiral of response and counter-response that 
leads to competition and even conflict.
37
 (A more comprehensive definition of this concept is set 
out in Chapter Five along with the discussion of how it helps to explain the history of space 
militarisation and arms control.) 
The security dilemma was chosen as a potential explanation as it seems an obvious fit with 
the history of space militarisation. Firstly, the history of space politics is largely one driven by 
states and the nature of military technology, which are the focus of security dilemma 
considerations. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, the security dilemma allows for conflict 
and competition to arise even where states have shared interests – such as in the case of space 
security – and where they harbour no expansionist or ‘malign’ intent. Thirdly, the security dilemma 
                                                 
32
 Tronchetti 
33
 Arévalo-Yepes et al,  p.6 
34
 Galloway, p.88 
35
 Gallagher, p.276 
36
 Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics 30(2):186-214 (1978), p.169 
37
 Jervis, p.169 
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literature identifies possible regulators of intensity, allowing for potential explanations for why an 
issue may seem more difficult to resolve at some points than at others.  
Despite its apparent applicability, few authors have explicitly considered the security 
dilemma concept when examining the threat of possible space weaponisation; the notable exception 
being those focussed on the narrower issue of the contemporary space relationship between the US 
and China.
38
 However, there are a number of articles that discuss elements of the dilemma in other 
contexts. Firstly, several authors demonstrate in their work the security dilemma’s focus on the 
importance of the character of technology – particularly the difficulty in distinguishing military 
from civilian technology and offensive from defensive weapons.
39
 Secondly, several articles discuss 
the persistence of key space powers’ uncertainties regarding the future intentions of their 
geostrategic rivals,
40
 and the increasing complex task states face in assessing space security risks 
and appropriate responses as the number of space actors,
41
 objects and possible applications grow
42
. 
Additionally, the literature points out, while states have grown in space capability they have also 
become increasingly vulnerable; the economic and strategic value of space continues to increase 
while potentially disruptive technology becomes more accessible to both state and non-state 
actors.
43
  
Thesis Approach and Structure 
This paper aims to address gaps in the literature by analysing the relative merit of a number 
of explanations for the fact that states have not been able to agree on a prohibition on space 
weapons. Chapter Two opens the discussion, providing a brief overview of space as a military 
                                                 
38
 Andrew Scobell, ‘Learning to Rise Peacefully? China and the Security Dilemma’, Journal of Contemporary China 
21(76):713-721 (2012), p.720; Baohui Zhang, ‘The Security Dilemma in the US-China Military Space Relationship’, 
Asian Survey 51(2):311-332 (2011), p.313 
39
 Peoples, ‘The Growing “Securitization” of Outer Space’, p.205 and Tronchetti, p.84 
40
 Tronchetti, p.81 
41
 Gallagher, p.260 
42
 Rathman, p.139 
43
 Gallagher, p.276 
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environment, the history of space militarisation, and key efforts to restrain and prevent the 
weaponisation of space. In doing so, it identifies a number of key characteristics of space 
militarisation and weaponisation that any comprehensive explanation of the absence of a 
prohibition on space weapons must address. 
Chapters Three and Four set out and assess the two most prominent of the explanations in 
the literature for the absence of a space weapons prohibition. As foreshadowed above, these are, 
respectively, that the US has acted as a non-status quo, expansionist, and/or ‘offensive realist’ state, 
and the institutionalist view that international governance has failed to date due to definitional 
issues and the dynamic nature of the space environment.  
Chapter Five proposes a relatively new explanation, namely that the history of space 
militarisation is best understood as the product of a security dilemma and that this security dilemma 
has prevented key space power states from agreeing on a prohibition on space weapons. This 
chapter explains the security dilemma concept before testing it against the history of space 
militarisation and arms control.  
Chapter Six sets out the paper’s main conclusions, chief of which is that the overall pattern 
of space militarisation (with certain exceptions) is consistent with the existence of a security 
dilemma, and that it is through the security dilemma that the failure of states to agree on a 
prohibition on space weapons is best understood. The paper ends by suggesting several potentially 
rewarding avenues for future research. 
Scope and Key Terms 
 Before a proper discussion can take place, it is necessary to define this paper’s scope and 
several key terms. This paper is an attempt to determine the best explanation for the fact that states 
have as yet been unable to establish a prohibition on space weapons. As a political analysis, it is not 
a technical study of the feasibility of various space weapons systems, an exhaustive history of space 
MSc Political Science Thesis (Supervisor: Dr Jan Erk) 
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militarisation or the development of space governance, or a legal analysis of different arms control 
proposals (except insofar as they reflect political realities). 
For obvious reasons, the geographic focus will be on outer space. There is no agreed 
definition of ‘outer space’ (henceforth simply ‘space’). However, this paper adopts the most 
commonly held unofficial definition, that space is all of the space surrounding the Earth in which 
objects can move without artificial propulsion systems and without being prevented from so doing 
by the resistance of the Earth’s atmosphere. In practical terms, ‘outer space’ extends infinitely 
upwards from an altitude of approximately 100-150 kilometres,
44
 but the particular focus of this 
paper is on Earth orbit as that is where the vast majority of human activity in space is located.
45
 
That said, it is important to note that the politics of space is “both terrestrial and extra-terrestrial: it 
is the relation of the Earth to its firmament”.46 In other words, the politics of space do not begin or 
end with the Earth’s atmosphere, and events on Earth have always have had an impact on space 
politics and vice-versa.  
The space focus requires attention be directed to particular states, namely those ‘key space 
power states’ with the greatest political weight. ‘Key space power states’ are therefore defined for 
the purposes of this paper as those states with the ability to indigenously produce, launch into orbit 
and recover spacecraft as these capabilities reflect the level of space technology required to provide 
at least a residual ability to attack objects in space. While the number of ‘key space power states’ 
has increased from one in 1957 to twelve by January 2013 by this definition, this paper will have a 
particular, though not exclusive, focus on the US, USSR/Russia, China and, to a lesser extent, 
Europe (originally the United Kingdom and France but increasingly a regional grouping). These 
entities have had the longest-running space programs, enjoy the most political weight and greatest 
                                                 
44
 Goldblatt, p.103 
45
 James Moltz, 'Space and Strategy: A Conceptual Versus Policy Analysis', Astropolitics 8(2):113-136 (2010), p.133 
46
 MacDonald, p.610 
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military power, represent the states most able to most weaponise space, and are the parties whose 
adherence to a prohibition would be most critical (including by pressuring other states to accede).
47
 
As veto-wielding members of the United Nations Security Council, they also play a dominant role 
in the organisation most likely to propose, oversee and potentially enforce any legal regime that 
prohibits the weaponisation of outer space.  
On a related note, the timeframe the paper will cover is the period from the launch of 
Sputnik in October 1957 to the launch of STSAT-2C by South Korea in January 2013. These dates 
represent the first launches of indigenously produced satellites into orbit by the first and most recent 
states to do so, and thus the emergence of the first and most recent ‘key space power states’.  
This paper defines ‘space weapons’ broadly to include ground-launched weapons (including 
ASATs) as well as weapons – conventional and otherwise – placed in space. The difficultly in 
defining ‘space weapons’ is central to considerations of space arms control and is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter Two. Lastly, it also adopts a broad conception of a ‘prohibition on space weapons 
and/or weaponisation’, noting that a number of elements might make up a comprehensive legal 
framework and allowing for possibility of partial legal frameworks.  
 
  
                                                 
47
 Tronchetti, p.87 
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CHAPTER 2: SPACE MILITARISATION AND ARMS CONTROL  
 
 “Succeeding space arms control efforts have primarily served to highlight the difficulties which 
key space powers have in coming to terms with the regulation of outer space” 
Columba Peoples
48
 
 
Before this paper can examine the most prominent explanations for the absence of a 
prohibition on space weapons, it is important to first establish a clear view of the issue being 
considered. This chapter sets the scene for the debate conducted in the next three, providing a 
necessarily brief introduction to the nature of space geography before discussing the history of 
space militarisation and efforts to regulate it. It concludes by listing five key characteristics of this 
history that any argument needs to address to properly explain the absence of a prohibition on space 
weapons. 
SPACE GEOGRAPHY 
 To some, the concept of geography might not appear to have application to space, which 
lacks the topographical features found on the Earth’s surface, reflects no state borders and appears 
virtually limitless. However, space does indeed have its own distinct geography and this has had, 
and continues to have, a significant shaping effect on the activities of space actors.
49
 
 The most critical characteristic is the all-pervading importance of gravity. Indeed, Earth’s 
gravity reflects its own ‘topography’ of gravity mountains and troughs; for instance, gravity is 
slightly less at the equator due to the fact the Earth is wider at that point.
50
 Gravity (along with 
atmospheric drag) means that most of the effort, cost and difficulty in getting an object into space is 
spent on escaping Earth’s atmosphere, but it also means that satellites can maintain orbits in certain 
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positions with no artificial thrust.
 51
 The impact of gravity and the Earth’s rotation means that the a 
launch’s location, direction, and timing can make huge difference to the fuel required to enter orbit 
and to its possible payload and cost.
52
In particular, it is helpful to be able to launch from the equator 
and to aim east (to take advantage of Earth’s spin).53 
Secondly, there are a number of stable orbital paths around Earth, each of which has their 
own particular advantages.
54
 Low Earth Orbits (LEOs) from about 150 to 800 kilometres assist 
close or detailed reconnaissance the Earth, robust communications links, and manned craft that need 
to maximise contact with ground control.
55
 Medium Earth Orbits (MEOs) from 800 to 35,000 
kilometres support linked satellite networks and are used for global navigation satellite systems and 
global telecommunications.
56
 High Earth Orbits (HEOs) of at least 35,000 kilometres provide 
greater fields of view and maximum coverage with the smallest possible fleet of satellites.
57
 
Geostationary orbits (GEOs) are HEOs at 36,000 kilometres in which a satellite placed above the 
equator can maintain its position relative to a fixed point on Earth; carefully placed in GEO, only 
three satellites are required to view all of Earth to 70 degrees latitude North and South.
58
 
Lastly, and more controversially, some authors – most notably Everett Dolman, a strident 
proponent of US military space development – argue that space, like the world’s oceans, airspace, 
and ground is home to ‘chokepoints’, ‘strategic narrows’ and commerce lanes of particular strategic 
importance.
59
 These include: specific orbits and transit routes that provide advantages in fuel 
efficiency, such as particularly efficient pathways from one orbit to another; the geostationary belt 
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around the equator; and the Lagrange Libration points (five specific locations where the 
gravitational forces of the Moon and Earth cancel each other out).
60
 They also include the Van 
Allen radiation belts – two areas circling the Earth inside its magnetosphere that trap radiation that 
can cause damage to transiting spacecraft, limiting space traffic movements.
61
 
HISTORY OF SPACE MILITATISATION AND ARMS CONTROL 
 The launch of Sputnik on 4 October 1957 is widely regarded as the start of the ‘space age’, 
although rocket technology had been tested since the mid-1940s by first Nazi Germany and then the 
US and USSR. It is also worth noting that Sputnik did not enter a complete international law 
vacuum when it entered orbit; the establishment of the United Nations (UN) in 1945 meant that 
states were subject to the general prohibition on the use of force under Article 2 of the UN Charter, 
subject to a right to proportionate and necessary self-defence, fully twelve years beforehand.
62
  
Following the Soviet’s success with Sputnik, the US House of Representatives passed a 
resolution in May 1958 that called for “strong [American] capability in the use of outer space, both 
as a deterrent to the use of military vehicles against this country and as an aid in developing 
antimissile techniques”.63 John F. Kennedy successfully appealed to Americans’ fear of Soviet 
space weapons to help win the 1960 Presidential election,
64
 and the ‘space race’ was on in earnest 
from the beginning of the 1960s.
65
 In July 1962, the United State launched the ‘Starfish’ series of 
nuclear tests partly to test the devices’ viability as ASATs, and in the process accidentally destroyed 
or damaged five American and one British satellites.
66
 Several months later, and after the Cuban 
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Missile Crisis, American nuclear-tipped interceptors were deployed in the South Pacific to counter 
hostile Soviet satellites, but these were soon withdrawn.
67
 
Despite his earlier rhetoric, President Kennedy was instrumental in the first real space arms 
control agreement. In 1963, the US and USSR renounced the deployment of WMD in space.
68
 This 
paved the way for the Partial Test Ban Treaty of the same year, which limited nuclear testing to 
underground locations.
69
 Militarily, the US continued its policy of ‘contingent restraint’ regarding 
ASATs – it kept activities at a low level as long as the USSR did the same.70 This generally positive 
direction reached a milestone in October 1967 with the entry into force of the Outer Space Treaty, 
still the bedrock of international space law. This stressed that space was to be used for peaceful 
purposes, banned the placement of WMD in orbit or on celestial bodies, assigned states 
responsibility for their space objects, and prohibited bases, testing and military manoeuvers on 
celestial bodies.
71
  
President Richard Nixon increased passive protection for American satellites and reduced 
ASAT research funding while maintaining the US’ existing basic ASAT capability.72 In 1972, and 
in recognition of the growing interdependence of nuclear deterrence, missile defence and space 
security, the US and USSR agreed to the bilateral Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. In the process, they 
severely restricted missile defence development, banned space-based ABM systems, and implicitly 
protected the use of satellites for monitoring compliance by banning interference.
73
 That same year, 
the multilateral Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects 
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(Liability Convention) reinforced the responsibility of states for damage caused by their space 
objects.  
During the Ford and Carter administrations the USSR launched a number of ASAT test-
flights, initiating a wave of anxiety in the US.
74
 Carter responded by seeking to negotiate an ASAT 
ban while hedging with new programs to develop new kinetic energy ASATs.
75
 Upon this 
backdrop, the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Registration 
Convention) established an [often unmet] obligation on states to keep details records of any object 
launched into or known to have exited space, including whether it had a military purpose, and to 
provide this information to the UN Secretary General.
76
 The 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of 
Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (Environmental 
Modification Convention) banned military activities in space that affect natural environmental 
processes.
77
 
During the late 1970s, the US and USSR restarted talks on ASAT controls. The talks were 
soon suspended indefinitely, but established an unofficial moratorium on ASAT development that 
was observed by both countries for almost two decades.
78
 In 1979, the second round of Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) banned ‘fractional orbital bombardment’ systems, a type of space 
weapon neither side had developed but was afraid the other might seek to deploy. In 1981, and 
reflecting growing concerns at the prospect of weapons in space, the USSR introduced the topic to 
the UN.
79
 A subsequent UN General Assembly resolution added the ‘Prevention of an Arms Race 
in Space’ (PAROS) to the objectives of the UN Conference for Disarmament.80 
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The administration of President Ronald Reagan marked a clear change from previous US 
approaches, and emphasised the potential uses of space militarisation rather than the use of space 
for stabilising nuclear deterrence.
81
 In 1983, Reagan announced the ambitious ‘Strategic Defence 
Initiative (SDI)’ to provide the US and its allies with effective ballistic missile defence systems 
(BMD), raising an outcry from Moscow. In 1985, an F-15 fighter jet destroyed an aging American 
meteorological satellite in 1985 using a ‘direct ascent’ missile.82 In the mid-1980s, the USSR 
ceased ASAT testing and established the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Agreement), which prohibited military basing and operations on 
the Moon and other celestial bodies but which enjoyed little support from other space powers.
83
 In 
1987, the Missile Technology Control Regime was stood up to control the proliferation of 
sophisticated military technology. In 1991 the USSR dissolved and left the US the world’s sole 
superpower.  
The Gulf War, deemed by several commentators as the first ‘space war’, saw the extensive 
use of space applications to support coalition operations in Kuwait and Iraq.
84
 It was followed by 
the increasing prominence of both space militarisation and efforts to ban space weapons during the 
1990s. On 19 June 1999, the US used a Theater High-Altitude Area Defense rocket to hit a target 
missile outside the Earth’s atmosphere, leading one commentator to lament that “outer space should 
no longer be considered as a sanctuary safe from military operations”.85  In 2000, China proposed 
the creation of a new international legal instrument or instruments to address the militarisation of 
space.
86
 An increasingly united diplomatic front between Russia and China soon developed, leading 
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to the release of a joint working paper in 2002 on a possible treaty that would address the 
militarisation of space.
87
 Reflecting what seemed to be a growing consensus on the need for 
regulation, the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (Hague Code) was 
established on 25 November 2002 to bolster efforts to curb ballistic missile proliferation.
88
 The 
administration of President George W. Bush pursued a different path. The US unilaterally withdrew 
from the ABM Treaty in 2002,
89
 and began the pursuit of a number of ambitious military space 
programs to develop and sustain capabilities to disrupt, deny, degrade and even destroy an 
adversary’s space capabilities and satellites.90 Russia threatened to deploy ‘Iskander’ missiles in 
Kaliningrad region in response.
91
 US military doctrine and policy statements increasingly advocated 
‘space dominance’ and reserved the right to develop ‘offensive counter-space’ capabilities.92 
In 2003, China demonstrated its growing space capability with its first manned space 
mission, Shenzou 5.
93
 In a move that shocked many, in January 2007 it conducted the world’s first 
ASAT test since 1999. The US responded with its own anti-satellite operation in February 2008, for 
the first time using a missile designed for theatre ballistic defence to destroy the aging spy satellite 
USA 193.
94
 To many, including commentators in both China and the US, these ASAT tests were 
indicators of the worrisome state of space security.
95
  
In February 2008, Russia and China jointly proposed a ‘Treaty on Prevention of the 
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space 
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Objects’ (known as the ‘PPWT’) at the UN,96 which failed in the face of US opposition97. The 
European Union’s (EU’s) ‘Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activities’, the second of the last 
decade’s most significant proposals for space arms control, was circulated in 2010 but is yet to 
receive a level of support sufficient for it to be considered applicable.
98
  
CHARACTERISTICS OF SPACE MILITARISATION AND ARMS 
CONTROL 
History of restraint regarding the use of space weapons 
 Historically, states have demonstrated remarkable restraint when it comes to the 
development, deployment and use of space weapons.
99
 Despite the fact that there was an average of 
two ASAT tests per year during Cold War, actual destructive testing has been very rare, and ASATs 
have never been used by one state against the assets of another.
100
 Since the first space arms control 
efforts of the early 1960s, space power states demonstrated adherence to the notion that space 
should be kept as a ‘sanctuary’ from the kinds of conflict that have historically plagued the Earth’s 
surface.
101
 This view has persisted among many policy makers and the world’s public, particularly 
outside of the US.
102
 It is also reflected in the system of space governance, which has as its core 
goal the fostering of peaceful development of space, and has led to significant international 
scientific cooperation – including the establishment of the International Space Station (ISS).103 
Perhaps less idealistically, key space power states have historically demonstrated an awareness that 
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space weapons might upset the nuclear status quo. Nuclear states rely on vulnerable surveillance 
satellites for the stability of nuclear deterrence, and the reluctance of the Cold War superpowers to 
develop and deploy sophisticated ASATs was at least partly due to the fear of the potential 
ramifications for nuclear stability.
104
 Nuclear forces continue to rely on satellites for early warning, 
targeting, and survivability and thus the potential for space conflict to ‘go nuclear’ cannot be 
discounted.
105
 
Accelerating Militarisation 
While there has always been a military dimension to space politics
106
, the accelerating pace 
of space militarisation – especially since 1991 – is striking. Firstly, and perhaps most obviously, 
more space actors are developing, deploying and using military space applications. Japan, India, 
Brazil, South Korea and a number of other states have joined the established space powers in 
deploying their own military satellites.
107
 This has resulted in military space becoming more 
crowded than ever; by the end of 2011 there were over 185 dedicated military satellites in orbit.
108
 
Secondly, the use of military space applications has evolved to include an ever-wider range of 
activities and greater military capability.
 109
 Early satellites had little real military capability, but as 
the Cold War progressed, the US and USSR – and later China and several states in Europe – 
developed more capable space-based assets, improving the quality of satellite imagery, the fidelity 
and security of military communications, and information processing.
110
 Military research also led 
to an ever broader range of military applications, including enhanced battlefield awareness, precise 
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navigation and targeting support, and real-time encrypted communications.
111
 Lastly, the increasing 
scope and capability of military space applications helped to drive space into the ‘mainstream’ of 
military planning, particularly from 1991. Their practical utility was established first in the 1991 
Gulf War, and cemented by later military operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq.
112
 States, 
especially the US and its European allies, increasingly placed space applications at the core of their 
military planning.
113
 
The Continued Centrality of States, Especially the US 
 The history of space militarisation and regulation also demonstrates the continued 
dominance of space politics by states, particularly the established space powers. On one level, this 
is surprising. More than 50 states, non-government organisations and multinational corporations 
now have at least one satellite in space as space technology has become more accessible.
114
 
However, not all space actors are equal when it comes to power and influence space politics.  
Firstly, among states the US and USSR/Russia have dominated military space, and continue 
to do so. Between them they launched more than 3000 military satellites to 2011, while all other 
states combined have launched fewer than 100.
115
 Furthermore, the US has come to completely 
dominate military space since the end of the Cold War; it was responsible for 92.6 percent of the 
global military budget by 1999,
116
 and by 2003 had 110 military-related spacecraft in orbit 
compared to Russia’s [aging] 40 the rest of world’s 20.117 Russia’s space and military budgets have 
recovered somewhat from the massive cuts endured during the 1990s, but were still only about five 
                                                 
111
 Space Security Index, p.9 
112
 McLean, p.244; MacDonald, p.601 
113
 Cervino et al, p.234; Dolman, p.93 
114
 Gallagher and Steinbruner, p.16 ; Peoples, ‘Securitisation of Outer Space’ p.84 
115
 Space Security Index, p.105 
116
 Cervino et al, p.233 
117
 Goldblatt, p.103 
MSc Political Science Thesis (Supervisor: Dr Jan Erk) 
Andrew Quinn (s1269135) 
 
 
22 
 
percent of the US’ by 2006.118 In 2011, the US still enjoyed a clear lead in the deployment of 
dedicated space systems to support military operations, accounting for roughly half of all dedicated 
military satellites, and outspent all other states combined on military space applications.
119
 
Secondly, several authors point out that many of the new class of corporate space actors are 
far from independent of state interest, despite the fact that commercial revenues have grown so 
much that they now outpace government space funding.
120
 In fact, at a minimum they are ‘shaped’ 
by the security concerns of states, and some even act as the active ‘vanguard’ of state interests.121 
This is due to a number of factors, including the history of state-ownership of space commercial 
entities, the fact that many companies make their money delivering on contracts with states, and the 
use of commercial competition by some states to grow their international influence.
122
 
Lastly, policy can be said to lead practice when it comes to space weaponisation.
123
 Indeed, 
space weapons and particularly space-based systems negation remain largely theoretical concepts, 
and states are yet to deploy such dedicated space systems.
124
 The history of space arms control 
largely reflects efforts to pre-emptively address weaponisation or to plan for it, rather than 
responses to real events.  Arguments both for and against the regulation of space weapons are 
therefore necessarily based on educated speculation, particularly regarding their potential political 
implications.
125
 The rhetoric of space weapons can sometimes seem decoupled from military 
reality; supporters of space weapons often harbour unrealistic expectations about the cost and 
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capability of future weapons systems, and overlook the fact that non-space military capabilities 
would be more practical and cost effective in most situations.
126
  
Ambiguity of Space Technology 
 The ambiguity of space technology has been absolutely central to states’ historic difficulty 
in regulating space militarisation. Firstly, despite its critical importance, the issue of defining space 
weapons has been ‘notoriously fraught’.127 States and commentators alike disagree on where the 
line is between ‘militarisation’, which most states accept as legitimate, and ‘weaponisation’, which 
remains highly controversial.
128
 Interestingly, some authors argue this distinction is itself useless.
129
 
Steven Lambakis argues arms control advocates use the term ‘weaponisation’ due to the negative 
connotations of the term, pointing out that “[t]alk of ‘weaponising’ the sea or air would have looked 
odd to generations past”.130 However, he does agree with the general academic consensus that that 
while a specific definition might be hard to arrive at, space militarisation is best seen as a 
continuum with totally peaceful use at one end and a subset of ‘weaponisation’ at the other.131 This 
still leaves the difficulty in defining when the ‘weaponisation’ line is crossed. 132 The placement of 
weapons in space would clearly be weaponisation, but disagreement persists on the status of 
ground-based weapons, space-based components of terrestrial weapons systems, and non-military 
space vehicles which could be used as projectiles.
133
  
The definitional issue shares significant overlap with another core problem, the ‘dual-use’ 
nature of space technology. Civilian space technology often has the ability to be used for military 
ends; almost all objects launched into outer space could be used, in one way or another, as a 
                                                 
126
 Goldblatt, p.104; Mueller, p.24 
127
 Peoples, ‘Securitisation of Outer Space’ p.78 
128
 Lambakis, p.75; Peoples, ‘Assuming the Inevitable?’, p.502 
129
 Lambakis 
130
 Lambakis, p.77 
131
 Mueller, p.5; Lambakis, p.77 
132
 Peoples, ‘Assuming the Inevitable?’, pp.502-3; Krepon and Katz-Hyman, p.325 
133
 Mueller, pp.6-7; Peoples, ‘The Growing Securitization of Outer Space’, p.205 
MSc Political Science Thesis (Supervisor: Dr Jan Erk) 
Andrew Quinn (s1269135) 
 
 
24 
 
weapon.
134
 Ground-based lasers can be used for communications and range finding as well as for 
blinding satellites,
135
 while new and low cost ‘microsatellites’ could potentially be used as kinetic 
ASATs.
136
 At the same time, states themselves are increasingly using civilian space assets and 
applications for military ends.
137
 This is for a variety of reasons, including privatisation, cost-
sharing, and wider conceptions of national interest, but has contributed to the general blurring of the 
line between military and civilian activity.
138
 
Critically, the dual-use nature of space technology and the difficulty in defining acceptable 
space militarisation mean that space ‘weaponisation’ is therefore best understood as a political 
rather than technical concept. A number of factors including basing, potential targets, attack 
mechanisms, effects, level of target discrimination and utility “would shape the political impact of 
any particular decision to develop or deploy space weapons [and] whether the action in question 
would or would not be considered to constitute the profound violation of the current space 
sanctuary norm with which many space weaponisation discussions are primarily concerned”.139 As 
Mueller points out, understanding that weaponisation is a political notion makes it clear that “we 
have not yet crossed the principal space weaponisation threshold precisely because almost everyone 
believes that we have not”.140 
 Lastly, the ambiguity of space technology has made it difficult for states to determine the 
likelihood and possible consequences of space conflict. Due to residual offensive capability, 
dual-use space assets already offer a number of states some ability to jam satellite communications 
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and control, kinetically attack satellites, or otherwise disrupt space activities.
141
 At the same time, 
this makes it almost impossible for states to tell if other states have adopted offensive or threatening 
military postures in space. A classic example of this problem is that of BMD; while ostensibly 
defensive in nature, missile interceptors also can be used to attack space assets.
142
 The difficulty in 
determining the nature and scale of the space threat is heightened by the secrecy under which states 
typically keep their military space activities. The fact that there have been no space conflicts as yet 
also makes it hard for states to be able to estimate the likely course of such a conflict, or even the 
‘rules’ under which it might take place.143 
Growing Vulnerability to Offensive Space Weapons 
The world is increasingly reliant upon the benefits of space applications for a huge range of 
activities, including economic development, navigation, international finance and military 
planning.
144
 This reliance has also generated significant vulnerability. Military and intelligence 
satellites are more valuable targets than ever due to their centrality to the planning and operations of 
space power states. Indeed, even minor disruptions to these would likely have significant military 
impact.
145
 At the same time, the growing economic interest of states in space since the late 1980s, 
together with the increasing use of civilian satellites for military purposes, means that the loss of 
even civilian satellites (which are usually more vulnerable to attack than military ones) would cause 
significant damage to state interests.
146
 
This vulnerability is heightened by the likely advantage of the offensive in any space 
conflict. Satellites are inherently very vulnerable as they are observable and predictable, limited in 
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their ability to evade objects, and difficult to fortify against collisions and attack.
147
 On the other 
hand, ASATs have become progressively cheaper and more easily deployed.
148
 The relatively 
inexpensive and potentially high potential of ASATs have led analysts to argue that some states, 
viewing space as both a new source of military threats and home to critical national infrastructure, 
might pursue asymmetrical responses to the perceived space dominance of others (particularly the 
US).
149
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CHAPTER 3: THE UNITED STATES AS AN OFFENSIVE 
REALIST STATE  
 
 “[C]an the United States ever have enough dominance when lives are at stake?” 
Steven Lambakis
150
 
 One of the most prevalent notions in the literature of space arms control, and one that has 
only become more popular since 1991, is that the US is responsible for the absence of a ban on 
space weapons due to its offensive realist pursuit of military power. Henceforth referred to the ‘US 
revisionism hypothesis’, this line of explanation argues that the US has historically used its military 
and political strength to actively oppose efforts to restrict weaponisation and, in contrast to the 
security dilemma argument set out in Chapter Five, it has done so out of malignancy. Proponents of 
this view – and these include both supporters and opponents of US space hegemony – point to the 
superpower’s historic technological lead, military superiority, and expansive definitions of its 
national security interests in space. Central to most discussions is the fact that with the dissolution 
of the USSR, US space policy has been freed to pursue its goal of total US space dominance.  
‘Astropolitics’ and American Empire 
 Perhaps the most controversial of contributions to understanding US actions is the work of 
Everett Dolman and those who subscribe to his notion of ‘Astropolitics’. Borrowing heavily from 
the literary tradition of 19
th
 Century geopolitics, Dolman argues that space, much like the air and 
maritime environments, offers considerable advantages to the state that is best able to capitalise on 
its geography. As mentioned in Chapter Two, to Dolman space is home to ‘chokepoints’, ‘strategic 
narrows’ and commerce lanes of particular strategic importance, and the primary purpose of US 
pace policy should thus be to control these.
151
 Dolman argues that the resources of space and ability 
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to deny others access would make the US virtually invulnerable and perpetuate its dominance of 
terrestrial politics as well.
152
 
Most advocates of US space militarisation and weaponisation do not go quite so far. 
However, they do agree that the best US approach to space politics is to dominate it both 
economically and militarily.
153
 The end of the Cold War and removal of the US’s only real 
superpower rival led some US decision-makers and military planners to adopt a particularly 
aggressive approach, arguing the US had a unique opportunity to take control of space for national 
interest reasons and even to secure the neo-liberal world order.
154 To these ‘advocates of American 
Empire’, the end of the Cold War was the end of a “zero-sum game, and one in which there had 
been one winner for all time – the US”.155 
Driving less aggressive proposals for space militarisation is the widespread view that 
conflict in space is inevitable, and that it is only prudent for the US to prepare by developing its 
own military and space weapon capabilities.
156
 Even where policy-makers are aware that the US 
might lose more from the weaponisation of space than it gains, there is still the view that if space 
weapons are going to happen, the US would only be doing itself a disservice in not developing them 
first.
157
 
Historical Restraint as the Product of Strategic Calculation 
According to the US revisionism hypothesis, the historical restraint of space power states 
regarding space weapons is due to strategic calculation rather than any sense of space as a 
sanctuary. Firstly, several authors have argued that the US and USSR exercised restraint in weapons 
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development during the Cold War in order to deny each other potentially threatening capabilities or 
to legitimise other military activities, not out of any concern for world peace. The language of 
cooperation used by the two superpowers during the Cold War was thus nothing but an excuse to 
buy time; “it seemed prudent to do everything possible to hinder the domination of the other – 
specifically, to declare space the unilateral province of all peoples while working feverishly to 
acquire the technological means and legal justifications to gain dominant control of it”.158 The 
Outer Space Treaty, so important in establishing international space law and the principle of 
peaceful use, was at best an “intermission, a period of détente in a win-lose encounter”,159 and at 
worst a successful attempt to legitimise the use of photo intelligence satellites by the USA.
160
 The 
end of the Cold War, in leaving the US without a real rival, heralded an end to constraints on US 
action and freed it of the ‘shackles’ of arms control.161 
Secondly, the continuing ‘restraint’ of all states but the US regarding space weaponisation 
since the end of the Cold War is argued to be best seen as reflecting the inability of those states to 
compete militarily. The US continues to outspend the rest of the world combined on military 
technology, including in space, and it seems natural that its strategic rivals might consider ways to 
hinder US capability. Evidence for this argument is found in the history of Chinese and Russian 
support for a treaty banning space weapons – this support has only really manifested after the Cold 
War, and the model proposed for the treaty would exclude terrestrially-launched ASATs that Russia 
and China have already developed.
162
 Furthermore, China’s ASAT test in 2007 seems to render its 
commitment to a space weapons prohibition somewhat hollow.
163
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Thirdly, and on a related point, the US’s historic tendency to refusal to sign legal 
agreements that would prohibit space weapons is seen as only logical given that such agreements 
are only calculated efforts to restrict US capability. As Lambakis argues, the US “should never take 
anything having to do with space (especially access to space or freedom to operate in space) for 
granted, and we should never unnecessarily limit [its] options.”164 The US’ decision to opt out of 
the ABM Treaty with Russia was thus a logical move in that it increased the US’s range of strategic 
options.
165
 
Overall, the US revisionism hypothesis partially explains the historic restraint of states 
regarding space weapons. Most usefully, it offers a good explanation for the US’ reluctance to agree 
to limits on space militarisation and weapons since its emergence as the only space superpower 
with the end of the Cold War. It also offers an interesting rationale for Chinese and Russian efforts 
since 1991 to ban space weapons. However, it does not account for the full history of the Cold War, 
the number of arms control concessions made by the US since it became unipolar (for example, in 
relation to nuclear weapons) and moves by the Clinton and Obama administrations to further link 
US security in space to global security more generally.  
Militarisation a Natural Extension of State Power 
For proponents of the US revisionism hypothesis, the accelerated militarisation of space is 
simply the natural result of an increasingly capable space state seeking to pursue an expansive 
conceptualisation of its national interest. The US has always been a leader in space militarisation, 
and the leader since the end of the Cold War. It has always spent the most money on military space 
technology.
166
 It has also always led the in applying space technology to military ends, and without 
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question is the state most dependent on space applications for its military strength.
167
 Space is now 
at the very centre of US military planning.
168
 This space dominance is seen as a massive advantage 
in that it provides political and military decision-makers options that would be unavailable if 
control of space was lost to others.
169
 It has also led to a growing feeling in some circles that space 
power is the most important form of military power and even the “apex of national security”.170 
US military policy and doctrine also has a history of reflecting ambitious plans for space 
technology. This is perhaps most clearly seen in the history of US BMD development; despite the 
USSR’s decision that BMD development was not an efficient of resources, the US has over time 
and at great cost developed increasingly sophisticated BMD technology. Such weapons systems are 
far from perfected, but they are already central to US approaches to space security despite the fact 
that most commentators argue that in destabilising deterrence BMD development did US security 
interests more harm than good.
171
 
Lastly, policy makers and military planners have demonstrated an adherence to the idea that 
the militarisation and eventual weaponisation of space is inevitable, and that it in the US’ interests 
not to let other states get there first. This is most clearly seen in the influence of US military 
doctrine, which has long reflected the belief that it is only a matter of time before space becomes an 
arena of conflict. During the 1990s and early 2000s, the inevitability thesis increasingly moved 
from the realms of doctrinal debate to national security policy, resulting in an increasingly threat-
based US view of space security.
 172
 Arguably, this has also resulted in a US ‘doctrinal realism’ that 
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considers notions of preserving space as a sanctuary from weapons naïve, and which has led some 
American opponents of arms development to bemoan the level of influence that the military has on 
national space policy making.
173
 As Salin puts it, “[e]ven though military commanders do (or 
should) not dictate public policies, their leitmotiv constitutes the permanent background ‘noise’ that 
any present and future US administration and Congress has to live with”.174 
The US revision thesis thus helps explain the country’s historic lead in space military 
technology development. It also highlights the hugely influential role that military doctrine has on 
US political perceptions of the space environment and appropriate responses to space security 
challenges. However, this line of explanation does not fully account for the fact that there have been 
times where US militarism efforts and budgets have decreased. Perhaps most fundamentally 
though, it also fails to take into account arguments that the US has the most to lose from space 
militarisation.
175
  
Pursuit of State Interest Drives Space Politics 
The US revisionism thesis is arguably most comfortable with historical fact that states, and 
the US in particular, have driven the politics of space weaponisation and arms control. It has little 
patience for international organisations, seeing them only as reflecting the interests of their state 
members. In this way, the history of the UN and its governance institutions is seen as a 
manifestation of first the interests of the victors of World War Two, the strategic competition 
between the US and USSR, and eventually, US unipolarity.  The reason space governance seemed 
robust in the early decades of the Cold War was because it was in the interests of the US and USSR 
to restrict each other to a strategic status quo in space. Likewise, the weakening of space 
governance reflected the US’s growing dominance after the Cold War and its decisions to pursue its 
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interests in space outside of multilateral frameworks.
176
 The fact that these international 
organisations rely on state members for resourcing as well as to ensure compliance with 
international law is another sign to proponents of the revisionism thesis that state actors are the ones 
worth considering. For their part, commercial actors simply serve as an extension of national 
interest. The US can directly pressure commercial entities through either involvement with their 
activities through dual-use projects or through regulation.
177
 Less directly, it influences their 
thinking by championing national commercial interests in space, a habit shared with other states.
178
 
This line of argument also aligns well with the idea that policy has led practice when it 
comes to space weapons. The US has historically seen the development of its space capabilities, 
including in military fields, as an indispensable tool of its global leadership.
179
 At times, this has 
required it to seek to develop advanced military space technologies, despite the uncertainty of 
success. More importantly, it has led to a US tendency to plan against notions of military 
technological development that are uncertain or even unfounded. US rhetoric on space weapons is 
sometimes decoupled from military reality altogether and harbours unrealistic expectations about 
the cost and capability of future weapons systems.
180
 
In summary, the US revisionism thesis enjoys perhaps its best fit with the historically 
state-driven nature of space politics. Its rational choice assumptions about the utility of space 
governance institutions reflect the inability of the UN system to stop increasingly unilateral actions 
by the US after the Cold War, as well as the tendency of states to use commercial entities to further 
their national interest. It also helps to explain the history of state policy leading international 
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practice as the product of US ambitions (combined with doctrinal realism, as discussed in the 
previous section).  
Ambiguity of Space Technology Drives Weapons Development  
The US has been a world leader in the dual-use of space technology, making increasing use 
of civilian space assets for its military space applications. This has led it to adopt a broad 
conception of national security, and to consider the space assets which provide it economic, military 
and other services as critical infrastructure.
181
 It has also been one rationale for US objections to 
past initiatives that would have controlled dual use technology; several presidents have argued that 
the dual-use nature of much space technology would make a ban on space weapons more likely to 
impede the peaceful use of space than provide a meaningful improvement to space security.
182
 
On a related point, the involvement of the US government in dual-use technology 
development as well as actual dual-use (ie military use of civilian assets) has historically led to 
concern in its international rivals. US research and development in technologies such as 
high-powered lasers, microsatellites, nanotechnology and vehicle guidance can and have been 
interpreted as efforts by the US to develop its military capability. 
Interestingly, the US has put considerable resources into developing the world’s most 
capable space situational awareness (SSA) capability, partly to be able to detect hostile moves by 
other states – even if prosecuted by dual-use technology. Run by the US Air Force Space Command 
(SPACECOM), the Space Surveillance Network (SSN) is a network of ground-based telescopes, 
radars and satellites that give the US military the world’s best view of the situation in space.183 
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The US revisionism thesis therefore explains the ambiguity of space technology as at least 
partly the product of the country’s extensive use of civilian assets for military purposes and the 
history of government involvement in dual-use technology development. It also highlights the US’s 
growing awareness that other states may use dual-use space technology to attack US space assets. 
However, given the state’s overwhelming military dominance since at least since 1991, it fails to 
explain why the US has not moved to deploy specifically-designed space weapons to act as a 
deterrent. 
Offensive Advantage as an Opportunity  
For the US revisionism thesis, the offensive advantage of space weapons, combined with the 
growing vulnerability of states to space attack, provides a clear rationale for the US to develop its 
own space weapons.
184
 Firstly, fears of US vulnerability due to its reliance upon space applications 
make it imperative that the country develop means of protecting its interests. If space weapons are 
too powerful to be built, the argument goes, they are also be too powerful to allow potential 
enemies to possess them.
185
 This idea is most famously evoked by former US Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld’s warning of ‘space Pearl Harbours’,186 and is manifested by a high level of US 
sensitivity to any moves by other states that hint at space weaponry. This helps to explain the level 
of alarm caused by the Chinese ASAT test of 2007, as well as arguable over-responses to Iranian 
and North Korean missile tests. George W. Bush, in renouncing the ABM Treaty, pointed to the 
need for the US to protect itself from ‘rogue states’ despite almost universal assessments that these 
states were no match for the US and would in any case find significantly greater utility in 
asymmetric military tactics on Earth.
187
 
                                                 
184
 Lambakis, p.76 
185
 Mueller, p.16 
186
 Peoples, ‘Assuming the Inevitable?’, p.506 
187
 Krepon and Katz-Hyman, p.331 
MSc Political Science Thesis (Supervisor: Dr Jan Erk) 
Andrew Quinn (s1269135) 
 
 
36 
 
Secondly, to advocates of US space weaponisation the offensive advantage provides a clear 
incentive to develop space weapons in order to capitalise on the military potential of these systems. 
With the end of the Cold War, the strategic rationale for the United States to maintain the 
prohibition against weaponising space is diminishing, leaving the way open for it to acquire 
potentially very useful space weapons as soon as possible.
188
  
In summary, the US revisionism thesis points out that even the world’s most powerful state 
is afraid of the offensive potential of largely theoretical space weapons.
189
 It helps to explain the 
regression from shared international understanding on the mutual benefit of keeping space 
unweaponised, as is argued to have taken place during Reagan and George W. Bush 
administrations.
190
 However, this aspect also highlights a critical flaw; if the US understands that 
the offensive has such a clear advantage, and that it is the most militarily powerful state, its decision 
not to deploy dedicated space weapons appears illogical. 
 CONCLUSION 
 In conclusion, the US revisionism thesis has a lot to offer, particularly in explaining how the 
history of space militarisation has largely been the product of US policy and actions since 1991. It 
also draws attention to the historical influence of doctrinal debates in the US, which has helped to 
drive militarisation by it and other countries. However, this argument is unable to explain the 
inconsistent approach that the US has taken to weapons and space arms control over time. The 
Reagan and George W. Bush administrations arguably fit the revisionist model, but were proceeded 
and followed by presidencies demonstrating considerably less aggressive approaches.  
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CHAPTER 4: FAILURES OF INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
 
 “[T]he legacy [governance] regime remains incomplete and has been unable to adapt either to 
increasing commercial utilisation or to the growing sophistication and consequence of military 
uses, especially by the United States.” 
Nancy Gallagher and John Steinbruner
191
 
 
 
 The most common line of explanation for the absence of an international prohibition on 
space weapons is that failures of international governance have prevented states from agreeing to 
such a regime (the international governance argument). In an apparent contradiction, many authors 
that subscribe to this view are actually quite optimistic. International law, governance and 
trust-building measures are seen as offering the best possibility of resolving the collective action 
problem of space security through a weapons prohibition; the correct combination of measures has 
simply not yet been found and implemented.  
This line of argument reflects a neo-institutionalist ‘calculus’ approach. Itself an umbrella 
concept under which multiple schools of thought exist, neo-institutionalism focuses on the 
relationship between institutions and the behaviour of political actors as well as on the process of 
institutional creation and change.
192
 Neo-institutionalism also makes two key assumptions: firstly 
that institutions matter; and secondly that political systems are inherently complex and thus 
unpredictable. The analytical and conceptual focus is thus on arrangements, rules, norms and values 
that can be said to constitute ‘institutions’ and which govern, or at least shape, political 
interaction.
193
 The calculus approach stresses the importance of strategic interaction between 
actors.
194
 Institutions affect behaviour by giving actors different degrees of certainty about the 
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behaviour of other actors, including though the provision of relevant information or by providing 
enforcement mechanisms to deter or punish certain types of behaviour. The persistence of 
institutions is explained by reference to their ability to contribute to the resolution of collective 
action problems.
195
  
THE COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM OF SPACE SECURITY 
Reflecting the calculus approach of neo-institutionalism, the international governance 
argument has at its core the idea that states face a collective action problem in space. This is the 
need for peace in space that stems from states’ mutual interest in maintaining safe access to Earth 
orbit.
196
 Proponents are optimistic that “compatible interests have always been far more common 
ion space than antagonistic ones”,197 and argue that by driving interdependency and trust, 
globalisation, transparency and information sharing will overcome obstacles to cooperation
198
. 
Proponents of the governance argument argue that “it would be in the interest of all states to have 
generally agreed rules of conduct enabling safety and security of space activities”.199  
The space collective action problem was linked to strategic stability during the Cold War, 
and provided the initial impetus for states to develop international space law and governance 
structures.
200
 However, the scope of governance activities has broadened as states recognise the 
extent of their shared interests.
201
 To governance proponents, the collective action problem in space 
has been made more difficult to resolve due to the post-Cold War unipolar world order. Indeed, 
commentators complain that, from their position of relative strength, many US decision-makers no 
longer see benefit in multilateral governance and increasingly view it as overly restrictive (this US 
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view is reflected in the argument set out in Chapter Three). US unilateralism reached its zenith with 
the  George W. Bush administration.
202
 However, governance proponents are not deterred, and see 
two main reasons for optimism. Firstly, while the US is both the most capable space power, it is 
also the country most dependant on vulnerable space applications.
203
 In the absence of an ability to 
defend all of its space assets all of the time – which few believe is possible – the US thus needs to 
prevent hostile action through restrictions on aggressive space activity and by reassuring other 
states of its own peaceful intentions.
204
 Secondly, and slightly more pessimistically, other authors 
argue that even though US might currently dominate the international system, history shows that 
“other forces and powers will tend to make the system multipolar” in time, reinvigorating 
multilateralism.
205
 
INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW AND NORMS 
 During the Cold War, and particularly the 1960s and 1970s, the two superpowers managed 
to agree a number of legal agreements that regulated their uses of space to some extent (see Chapter 
Two for a more detailed history). The most important of these were the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, 
the 1979 Moon Agreement, the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, the 1972 ABM Treaty and the 1977 
Environmental Modification Convention.
206
 The space legal and governance regime worked 
reasonably well during the early Cold War, as the US and USSR dominated space, shared an 
interest in stable deterrence, and were only able to deploy rudimentary space capabilities that 
limited military satellites to passive support.
207
  
However, international law failed to keep pace with developments during the last decade or 
so of the Cold War as space grew more congested and the number of ways in which space 
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applications could be used increased.
208
 It became clear that the Outer Space Treaty, which along 
with the BMD Treaty represented the only instruments limiting space weaponisation, lacked the 
compliance and governance mechanisms to allow for enforcement and the addressing of ambiguous 
situations and technologies.
209
 It became increasingly clear that existing space law instruments were 
simply not up to the task of preventing space weaponisation.
210
 
There have been a number of initiatives put forward in the last decade to attempt to address 
the growing problem posed by space weaponisation. The two most notable have been the Russian-
Chinese joint proposal for a PPWT in 2008 and the EU’s proposed Code of Conduct of 2010.211 
The PPWT failed in the face of opposition from the US, whose main objection was the document’s 
failure to address the issue of ground-based ASATs, a capability owned by both Russia and 
China.
212
 For its part, the EU Code of Conduct continues to receive mixed support
213
 
One of the central problems facing international space law efforts at arms control is the 
difficulty in defining key terms. These stem from the Outer Space Treaty’s failure to properly 
define the ‘peaceful purposes’ to which space could be put, and are most clearly visible in the issue 
of defining ‘space weapons’.214 As discussed in Chapter Two, the issue of defining ‘weapons’ in the 
space context has been historically fraught, with particular issues being the point at which 
acceptable military use become unacceptable ‘weaponisation’ and how best to address the challenge 
of the dual-use nature of space technology.
215
 Other definitional issues make the definition of 
weaponisation even more difficult; space law currently has no comprehensive conception of 
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liability for damage caused by space assets, and is particularly problematic in its application to 
non-state actors.
216 
 
A number of global trends have also increased the difficulty of implementing a legal 
prohibition on space weapons. Firstly, more states are space actors than ever before, rendering 
reaching a consensus among stakeholders much more difficult. It is now increasingly unlikely that 
agreement between any two or three countries – even China, Russia and the United States – could 
adequately manage space security.
217
 Secondly, the increasing number of private actors raises the 
problem of defining property rights in space and the liability of private actors, as well as risks states 
coming to conflict over commercial issues.
218
 Thirdly, the increasing use of dual-use technology by 
states challenges the space law regime as it makes it harder to distinguish between civilian scientific 
research, commercial applications and military activities.
219
  
 The combination of complicating trends and definitional difficulties has led proponents of 
international space governance to argue for one or the other of two legal approaches. The first is the 
more traditional, or ‘hard’ law, solution found in binding international treaties that set out 
compliance and enforcement mechanisms. Such an approach would build on the widely-ratified 
Outer Space Treaty, which already includes many of the basic principles of space governance.
220
 As 
demonstrated by the failure of the PPWT though, a treaty that bans space weapons would have to 
prohibit both space-based weapons and ground-based ASATs, as well as the testing of dual-use 
systems in ‘ASAT mode’.221  
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Those who favour a ‘soft law’ approach, which stresses guidance over direction, argue that 
“the era of grand multilateral arms controls agreements in relation to outer space is, if not dead, then 
at the very least exhibiting morbid symptoms”.222 States have demonstrated a preference for soft 
law in space governance for several decades, especially on disarmament and security matters.
223
 
Importantly, while some have argued that soft law would be “less than ideal”,224 soft law can still 
build international norms through promoting confidence and openness and, over time, pressuring 
states who do not abide by those norms
225
. Supporters of the soft law approach argue that the EU 
Code of Conduct, which is a ‘soft law’ instrument and which already enjoys some support, offers a 
useful template for further development.
226
 However, arguably the greatest benefit of adopting a 
soft law approach along the line of the EU Code of Conduct would be the ability to capitalise on a 
joint commitment to the prevention of the weaponisation of outer space by the major space powers 
of the EU, China, and Russia.
227
  
SPACE GOVERNANCE 
 A natural focus of proponents of the international governance argument is the body of 
governance institutions set up to oversee space activities. These offer the potential to improve space 
governance if equipped with decision-making and implementation powers and the mandate, legal 
authority, and resources needed to effectively oversee space activities.
228
 As the governance 
argument points out though, it is striking that despite the growth of institutions to oversee the 
peaceful use of space, the development of an overarching normative regime for space security has 
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been painfully slow and space governance institutions are overly specialised and under-
coordinated.
229
 
 The most prominent and important are the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space (UNCOPUOS), the UN Conference on Disarmament (UNCD).
230
 UNCOPUOS has 
historically struggled with the issue of space militarisation, reflecting disagreement between its 
state members on the question of the scope of its mandate to oversee the peaceful uses of outer 
space.
231
 It has had some successes though, developing guidelines for space debris mitigation, 
concepts of state liability for objects launched from their territory and general space traffic 
management.
232
 While the issue of the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) was 
added to the agenda of the UNCD in 1982, discussions have largely been deadlocked on the issue 
ever since.
233
 Protracted talks have failed to address issues relating to working methods, let alone 
the initiative’s goal of mitigating space militarisation through building confidence and shared 
understandings of space as a security environment.
234
 PAROS discussions have been further 
hampered by US objections that there is no arms race occurring in space in the first place.
235
  
Central to notions of space governance is the idea that space security as a collective action 
problem requires a collective security response. Critically, international institutions themselves 
usually have little to no space or other military capability, and thus rely upon state members for 
monitoring and enforcement. This makes collective security in space problematic as collective 
security still relies upon the key space power states for enforcement.
236
 With the US, China, Russia 
and the EU (through the United Kingdom and France) all veto-wielding members of the UN 
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Security Council, the UN seems unlikely to be able to take action against any of these space powers 
This reflects the continued centrality of key space power states to space politics. 
  
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES (TCBMS) 
 The last focus of the international governance explanation is the history of trust and 
confidence-building measures (TCBMs). To several authors, while TCBMS have their limitations, 
they offer useful insights into the history of relationships between space states, play a prominent 
role in the evolving space regime, and would increase the likelihood of agreement on a prohibition 
on space weapons.
237
  
The foundational assumption behind TCBMs is that they facilitate transparency and 
reassurance by communicating the peaceful intentions of a state to potential rivals, especially as the 
level of transparency demonstrated by a state is itself a policy choice.
238
 By building cooperation at 
the margins of a relationship between competing states, TCBMs can “stabilise strategic stability by 
ensuring that nobody believes they could gain more than they would lose by initiating an 
unprovoked attack, and by reducing misperceptions, false alarms of impending attack, command 
and control failures, and other problems”.239 International TCBMs often involve making public, or 
sharing with other states, information about a state’s security policies, military capabilities, arms 
imports and exports, or defence budgets.
240
 TCBMs can be bilateral or multilateral; the former tend 
to be easier to achieve while the latter bind states to greater responsibility through the discipline of 
peer pressure.
241
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Space has historically been seen by many as conducive to international cooperation given its 
absence of state borders and resulting “space perspective… [from which] the Earth appears as an 
integrated and independent system"
242
. TCBMs, primarily those related to arms control and nuclear 
non-proliferation, but also some relating to space, played a role in stabilising the Cold War military 
rivalry. Space TCBMs were often aimed at non-controversial security issues, such as dealing with 
dangerous orbital debris, establishing the potential for damaging collisions, managing the growing 
saturation of the radiofrequency spectrum and organising an increasingly crowded Earth orbit. 
TCBM success has always been influenced by the speed of technological change and broader 
geopolitical developments.
243
  
One area in which analysts see particularly promising prospects for TCBMs is space 
situational awareness (SSA). SSA is critical to a range of civilian and military activities in 
providing awareness of space objects, the likelihood and nature of potential collisions, and 
indicators of hostile intent. It is also expensive and technically difficult, leaving a robust capability 
out of the reach of most states. SSA thus provides a potential opportunity for states to cooperate 
through sharing costs and technology. TCBMs relating to SSA cooperation may also give some 
states the confidence they need to agree on a ‘soft law’ code of conduct.244  
TCBMs also have displayed historical difficulty in dealing with commercial actors and 
dual-use technology. Commercial actors present a special problem regarding transparency; how 
would a company clarify its intentions, to whom, and what would make its rhetoric credible given 
its absence of a clear territory?
245
 The dual-use nature of space technology makes it hard to 
distinguish purely civilian projects from ones that might have a military use, and it has been argued 
that some civil organisations turn a blind eye to the fact that their work relies on, and in some cases 
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contributes to, the increasing militarisation of space.
246
 The deliberate use by states of civilian 
infrastructure for military purposes makes the situation more difficult yet; dual-use projects can 
build military capability under circumstances of ambiguity, even if undertaken in a TCBM context, 
compromising the use of TCBMs in preventing space weaponisation.
247
  
CONCLUSIONS 
 In conclusion, the international governance argument provides useful insights into the ways 
in which international space law, governance institutions and TCBMs have shaped the history of 
space militarisation and arms control efforts. It helps to explain the role of ambiguous space 
technology in driving militarisation through explaining the difficulty that negotiators have had in 
attempting to define ‘space weapons’. Through discussion of the historic role of international law 
and institutions, as well as their gradual weakening by the end of the Cold War, it highlights a 
reason why space powers were restrained in their behaviour in the early decades of the space age 
but were less so later. In paying particular attention to the US’ unilateral approach to space law and 
governance after the Cold War, it throws light on the central role of the US in the politics and 
governance of space. Lastly, it suggests the utility of a ‘soft law’ approach, supported by measures 
that assist transparency and trust, in addressing weaponisation concerns. 
However, this line of explanation remains unsatisfactory overall. Most critically, it 
downplays the political dimension in which space governance operates, largely overlooking the 
importance of the relationship between states outside of international organisations. It fails to ask 
the question of why it is that Russia and China have become such great supporters of space arms 
control initiatives since the end of the Cold War, and in doing so misses the fact that multilateral 
governance can be seen as a tool through which states restrain the capabilities of rivals.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE SECURITY DILEMMA 
 
 “The security dilemma will operate much more strongly if statesmen do not understand it, and do 
not see that their arms – sought only to secure the status quo – may alarm others and that others 
may arm, not because they are contemplating aggression, but because they fear attack from the first 
state. The two failures of empathy are linked.” 
Robert Jervis
 248
 
 
 
The concept of the ‘security’ dilemma offers an alternative and particularly comprehensive 
explanation for the absence of a prohibition on space weapons that also addresses some of the 
shortcomings of the arguments for US revisionism and failures of international governance. This 
chapter explains the security dilemma concept before applying it to the politics of space 
militarisation and arms control and investigating the effect of relevant material and psychological 
regulators.  
THE SECURITY DILEMMA CONCEPT 
Argued by some to be one of the most important theoretical ideas in international relations, 
the security dilemma was first theorised by John Herz and Herbert Butterfield in separate 
publications in 1951, but is probably best known through the work of Robert Jervis.
249
 These three 
authors argue that benign states can be drawn into conflict with one another by the dynamics of a 
dilemma in which security-seeking moves by one may lead another state to fear its intentions, 
causing it to strengthen its own military capabilities and decreasing security overall.
250
  
Regrettably, the three great champions of the security dilemma defined the concept only 
loosely and there is thus no universally agreed definition.
251
 This paper therefore adopts the 
definition set out by Shiping Tang, who combines the common elements set out by Butterfield, 
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Herz and Jervis with other factors now recognised as integral.
252
 Three elements are critical: states 
must be operating in an environment that is structurally anarchic and which leads to uncertainty and 
fear regarding the intention of other states; there must be a lack of malign intent on the part of the 
states involved; and there must be some accumulation of power.
253
 Another five elements are either 
consequences or regulators of the security dilemma: the power accumulated by states to defend 
themselves inevitably has some level of offensive capability; dynamics are self-reinforcing and can 
lead to spiralling decline of interstate relationships; the accumulation of absolute power through 
some capabilities can become self-defeating by decreasing security in relative terms (eg. through 
arms races); the security dilemma can lead to tragic results such as unnecessary conflict; and 
severity can be regulated by material and psychological factors.
254
 
In perhaps Tang’s greatest contribution to security dilemma theory, he points out that the 
ambiguity of past definitions and their focus on how they lead to conflict through the dynamics of 
response and counter-response have led to a historical tendency to confuse the security dilemma 
with spiral theory.
255
 As he points out, a “spiral merely denotes a situation in which tension between 
two states is continuously increasing because the process is driven by a self-reinforcing 
mechanism…[and] says nothing about the nature of the forces that drive the process”.256 This 
differentiation is useful for two reasons. Firstly, the security dilemma can lead to a spiral to conflict, 
but not all security dilemmas lead to conflict and neither are all conflicts driven by a security 
dilemma.
257
 Secondly, and more importantly, the dynamics of the security dilemma and its 
relationship to spiral models should be understood as a reversible and graduated continuum.
258
 As 
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Tang puts it, “anarchy generates uncertainty; uncertainty leads to fear; fear then leads to power 
competition; power competition activates a (dormant) security dilemma; and the activated security 
dilemma leads to war through a spiral”.259 
The security dilemma shares realism’s view of the political system as structurally anarchic 
and underpinned by the dynamics of mutual fear and distrust between actors.
260
 Uncertainty in 
politics is seen as structural, persistent and inevitable, as is the impossibility of an actor ever being 
able to fully empathise with other actors.
 261
 Uncertainty frequently prevents states from 
communicating their motives, and states cannot escape the fear that states which are currently status 
quo actors may change their minds later.
262
 The security dilemma is most closely associated with 
defensive rather than offensive realism, because it assumes states are generally benign and security 
rather than power-seeking.
263
  
There are a number of key empirical features of the security dilemma concept. Firstly, and 
reflecting its realist assumptions, the elements upon which the security dilemma focuses its 
attention are states and military technology; it is the ambiguous symbolism of the latter, as well as 
the former’s perceptions of these, that inform most security dilemma analyses.264 Secondly, security 
dilemma users often use historical studies, although it must be admitted that these are usually for 
the purposes of comparison between different dilemmas rather than the assessment of the validity of 
security dilemma forecasts. Thirdly, proponents borrow the idea of game theory, most famously the 
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Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Stag Hunt, from rational choice theory.265 This allows for one-off or 
repeated deductive exercises in which the calculations of two (or more) actors under the security 
dilemma are posited and assessed.  
A number of potential flaws in the concept need to be kept in mind. Empirically, the 
security dilemma can be used erroneously to project patters of past behaviour into the future, and its 
empirical record is poor in situations where logic would seem to hint that actors should change their 
course of action but do not.
266
 The security dilemma’s foundation in realism also opens it to 
criticisms of that school of theory; arguably, it fails to properly consider non-state actors, including 
international institutions and commercial entities, and pays insufficient attention to the process 
through which ‘the state’ defines its interests. 
The concept also appears to have a major flaw of direct relevance to the discussion of space 
arms control. Traditionally, the security dilemma has been almost exclusively used to analyse paths 
to historical wars. This raises the question of whether the security dilemma is a self-fulfilling 
prophecy; if only applied to wars it is hardly surprising that its proponents find its dynamics lead to 
conflict. It also would seem to suggest only limited utility in studying a situation that has not, or at 
least has not yet, led to open conflict. However, in understanding the security dilemma – along with 
spiral theory – as a continuum, the history of space militarisation can be assessed to determine the 
role security dilemma dynamics may have played. 
DETERMINING A SECURITY DILEMMA IN SPACE MILITARISATION 
For the politics of space arms control to represent a security dilemma, it must meet the 
three-part test of Tang’s definition; international anarchy, some accumulation of power, and an 
absence of malign intent. 
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At first sight, it would appear that space has historically been one of the least anarchical 
‘environments’ in which states have interacted. The UN Charter placed limits on the use of force 
and created a system of collective defence through the UN Security Council 12 years before 
Sputnik was launched. International space law was established and developed in the early decades 
of the space age. A number of international organisations including UNCOPUOS and UNCD have 
been created to oversee space governance. However, further consideration makes it clear that space 
power states continue to operate under an international system that is, at its core, anarchical. 
International law is remarkably silent on the matter of space weapons (other than WMD), far from 
universally adhered to, and subject to the agreement of states for enforcement. UN actions 
involving the use of force (which is central to deterrence and thus collective defence) are subject to 
vetoes by representatives of the most powerful space powers, which are also coincidentally the 
states most capable of conducting aggressive space activities and developing space weapons. 
Additionally, uncertainty and fear persist in the space environment as well as on the ground. A 
growing number of increasingly capable state and non-state actors now interact in space in 
ever-more complicated patterns and by using dual-use technology.
267
 States fear their growing 
vulnerabilities in space as they become more dependent on space applications. Exacerbating 
uncertainty has been the historically high level of secrecy of state space activities in space, out of 
either fear that transparency might reveal militarily capabilities or worry it would compromise the 
sources and methods of state intelligence collection.
268
  
The second criteria that must be met is the accumulation by states of power that has at least 
residual offensive capability. In most environments, this power is obviously military in nature, and 
the absence of [clearly defined] space weapons dedicated to offensive purposes thus seems to be an 
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indicator that this element of the security dilemma might be problematic in the space environment. 
However, and as Chapter Two made clear, the history of space politics is one of states with growing 
military and civilian capability. Most obviously, key space power states have developed significant 
dedicated military capabilities. The most obvious of these are ASATs, which a number of states 
now have tested or at least designed, and the US’ BMD interceptors.269 While the legal status of 
these technologies as ‘weapons’ might be unclear, their offensive potential is not, and as the most 
visible manifestation of largely hidden state space weapons development, every ASAT test has 
historically stimulated the weapons development programs of other states.
270
Additionally, the 
development of advanced dual-use space technology has given states considerable ‘latent’ military 
capability in space.
271
 Thirdly, even moves by states to develop ‘purely defensive’ ways to protect 
their space systems, such as through hardening or redundancy, can be seen as the accumulation of 
capability and may motivate adversaries to develop more effective weapons to overcome them.
272
 
Lastly, for a genuine security dilemma to exist, there must an absence of malign intent. 
Indeed, this is arguably the most important criteria as anarchy and some accumulation of power are 
usually present.
273
 It is also the most problematic, as determining a state’s intentions is always 
difficult. The most useful indicator of intent is state conceptions of national security interest. Lofty 
security desires make it hard to capitalise on common interests, and if the irreconcilability of 
interests is the result of a state defining its security needs in an expansive way, that state is 
malignant and the security dilemma no longer exists.
274
 One could argue that, for the majority of the 
Cold War, the US and USSR found ways to accommodate their security interests in space. The 
number of agreements between these two parties on space technology seemed to signal a shared 
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understanding of the hazards of using weapons in space and of the mutual interdependence required 
to benefit from space operations.
275
 The exception to this rule is the Reagan administration, during 
which the US significantly expanded its national interest in space. The 1990s saw a return to more 
restricted notions of US national interest, if only because there seemed no clear threat, but the 
Presidency of George W. Bush saw the US adopt a drastically more aggressive space policy and 
renounce the ABM Treaty. The Obama presidency has (thus far) marked a return to more restrained 
rhetoric and a less confrontational approach to space security. For its part, China’s tendency to 
avoid transparency in the objectives and activities of its space program makes it hard for other 
states to determine China’s intentions, especially as China classifies satellites believed to be of 
military or dual use as ‘scientific’.276 
There is considerable evidence of self-reinforcing security dilemma dynamics in the history 
of space militarisation and arms control. The course of the Cold War itself arguably reflects a 
security dilemma – as one superpower developed more powerful, capable or numerous weapons 
technology, the other would take steps to improve its own capabilities.
277
 The politics of space 
militarisation mirrored these dynamics and is most clearly demonstrated by the history of BMD and 
ASAT developments. Developments in these fields have always been interpreted as threatening.
278
 
Thus the US moved to match Soviet ASAT testing in the 1970s, the USSR and Russia threatened 
threats to deploy missiles in reaction to US moves to deploy BMD components in Europe, and 
China conducted its ASAT test in 2007 in response to US BMD developments.
279
 Security dilemma 
dynamics have not disappeared with the end of the Cold War, and are particularly prominent in the 
US-China space relationship. Indeed, this is where the majority of literature on a strategic dilemma 
in space comes from; one author credits the security dilemma with causing an emerging Sino-US 
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strategic rivalry in space,
280
 while others warn that missile defences and the possible weaponisation 
of space pose the danger of a ‘new Cold War with China’281.  
The most important manifestation of dilemma dynamics has been the general failure of 
states to demonstrate ‘security dilemma sensibility’, namely the notion that their own 
security-seeking moves might be seen as threatening by states who would then feel a need to 
respond in kind.
282
 This ‘failure of empathy’ is at the very core of the security dilemma.283 Jervis, 
writing in 1979, pointed out that US decision makers were only just starting to realise it was 
possible that the USSR’s military actions might be partly the result of fear of US aggression.284 
Despite this growing awareness, US policy makers continued to largely be oblivious to the fact that 
the more space-based systems reduced US concerns, the more likely Russia and China were to seek 
ways to shore up their own capabilities.
285
 Particularly aggressive supporters of US weaponisation 
are also clearest examples of ‘failures of empathy’, often stating that the US – as a liberal 
democracy and force for international good – could not possibly pose a threat to any but potential 
wrongdoers.
286
 Chinese policy-makers have also historically failed to demonstrate security dilemma 
sensitivity, arguing that their relative military weakness could not possibly pose a threat to the 
US.
287
 For its part, Russia seems to be displaying a growing awareness of security dilemma 
dynamics, if only because the end of the Cold War has seen its role evolve from equal leader in 
space development to a more modest one in which it is more concerned about the implications of 
US and Chinese developments.
288
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REGULATORS OF THE SPACE SECURITY DILEMMA 
The security dilemma’s intensity can be regulated by both material and psychological 
factors, which render it anywhere from dormant to acute.
289
 A number of regulators have been 
noted by authors, although very few besides the character of military technology have been 
analysed in depth or applied consistently.
290
 
Material Regulators 
Firstly, where states share a faith in a functioning international security system, the security 
dilemma is less acute because the victim of any offensive moves would be able to mobilise support 
and resources for reprisals.
291
 Historically, international governance has evolved as a regulator from 
a strong to weak moderating influence. The “vagaries of the space militarisation-weaponisation 
debate” have always played their part, preventing space power states from agreeing on a full 
prohibition on space weapons.
292
 However, during the Cold War key space power states did agree – 
and for the most part, abide by – a number of international treaties and restrictions on military space 
technologies. The end of the Cold War, and the strategic rivalry that defined it, has seen the US in 
particular demonstrate a lack of willingness to agree to new accords, and even withdraw from them 
in the case of the ABM Treaty. Additionally, the US, Russia and China are all veto-wielding 
members of the UN Security Council, preventing the world’s main enforcement mechanism from 
taking effective action against them.
293
 
 Secondly, geography has acted as a regulator in two ways. It makes access difficult in the 
first place, minimising the number of states that might threaten each other and highlighting the 
importance of space situational awareness (SSA) in the absence of international borders. Initially, 
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the influence of this factor was moderating as few states were able to interact in space. Due to the 
cost and technical requirements of space launches, states developed genuinely cooperative ties on 
SSA for scientific purposes.
294
 However, while scientific cooperation has continued, space has 
become increasingly congested. At the same time, the US remains the only state with its own robust 
SSA capability.
295
 This has left most states without the ability to both identify potential collisions 
and the possibility that a collision was the result of hostile intent.
296
 
 Thirdly, whether the offence or defence has the advantage in the event of conflict is a 
widely-recognised regulator of the security dilemma; an offensive advantage makes states both 
more afraid and more likely develop their own offensive weapons, rendering others less secure in 
turn.
297
 This has always been one of the most intensifying regulators as the offence has a clear 
advantage in space for two reasons. Offensive weapons technology is less expensive and simpler to 
develop and use than defensive technology; ASATs are much cheaper and less technically 
demanding than expensive satellites.
298
 Additionally, space weapons themselves are vulnerable 
because like all space objects, they move predictably due to orbital geography, cannot remain over 
friendly territory, and are difficult to conceal.
299
 This makes it imperative to deploy them before 
they are attacked.
300
  
Fourthly, and related to the offensive-defensive balance, is the ease with which defensive 
weapons can be distinguished from offensive ones.
 301
 If differentiation is possible, the security 
dilemma is alleviated somewhat as non-status quo states are easier to identify.
302
 Unfortunately, the 
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space arms control security dilemma is one in which differentiation has always been very difficult, 
and this regulator increases its intensity as a result.  Systems which are recognised as military all 
have offensive potential, as is clear from the example of BMD interceptors.
303
 Most critically 
though, space technology is characterised by its intrinsically dual-use nature (as discussed in 
Chapter Two), making it difficult to ascertain what is or may be a weapon, let alone whether a 
weapon is offensive in nature. The combination of offensive advantage and difficulty in 
differentiation makes the space weapons security dilemma what Jervis would call ‘doubly 
dangerous’.304  
The last of the material regulators is the level of asymmetry in power of international actors. 
This can act as a mediating influence where states are of roughly equal capability, thus offering 
each other only a moderate threat, or where one state is so dominant none can challenge it. 
Arguably, the strategic stability of space politics during the Cold War was at least partly a product 
of a the largely stable bipolar world order. Unipolarity has intensified the security dilemma; a world 
power “cannot help but have the ability to harm many others that is out of proportion to the others’ 
ability to harm it” points out Jervis,305 and as such states that see the US as a potential threat are 
driven to develop ways to counter US strength
306
. Even incremental advances in US capability 
pressures other states to respond. Russia and China have been the most obviously concerned, 
simultaneously improving their own space capabilities, investigating asymmetrical ways to counter 
US conventional strength and seeking agreement on limiting international instruments.
307
 
                                                 
303
 Krepon and Katz-Hyman, p.325 
304
 Jervis, p.211 
305
 Jervis, p.185 
306
 Moltz, p.131 
307
 Gallagher and Steinbruner, p.72; Space Security Index, pp.20-2; Krepon and Katz-Hyman, p.323; Robinson, p.33 
MSc Political Science Thesis (Supervisor: Dr Jan Erk) 
Andrew Quinn (s1269135) 
 
 
58 
 
Psychological Regulators 
 Several psychological regulators also have a noticeable effect on the security dilemma that 
underlies space militarisation and arms control. 
First is the nature of the historical relationship between states.
308
 Historical legacies have 
generally been an intensifying factor. The relationship between two major space actors – the US 
and [Western] Europe – has historically been good. However, and more importantly, space politics 
has always been marked by antipathy between at least two major space powers. Tang argues that, 
due to fact that the US and USSR had seen each other as expansionist threats between 1945 and 
1953, Premier Khrushchev and President Eisenhower inherited a security dilemma that was very 
‘deep’.309 The Cold War may have ended but it has left a legacy of distrust between the US and 
Russia. The historic enmity between the US and China dates to the end of the Chinese civil war in 
1949, and has only been heightened by cultural misunderstandings.
310
 
A second, and relatively new, potential psychological explanation for the difficulty in 
establishing a prohibition is that the increasing ‘securitisation’ of space politics has made it difficult 
for states to compromise and heightened their sensitivity to military threats. Most prominently 
espoused by Columba Peoples,
311
 this notion posits that space issues are increasingly being framed 
as national security ones by states, partly in order to justify more urgent decision-making and the 
adoption of extraordinary measures (such as the expenditure of large amounts of money on security 
initiatives).
312
 While this can be seen by optimists as raising the profile of space issues and thus 
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international cooperation, it also heightens the sensitivity of decision-makers to developments in 
space as these are seen through a security lens.
313
 
The third relevant psychological regulator is that of states’ concern for their international 
reputations. While in a way this can temper the security dilemma – contemporary states do not want 
to be seen as aggressors – on the whole it has made it more acute. A desire for international prestige 
has always driven space capability development, and analysts have argued that the Chinese space 
program is the product of a desire by Chinese elites for China to be respected on international 
stage.
314
 At its worst, the concern for reputation and prestige can manifest as aggressive space 
nationalism. The US and China have both used bellicose rhetoric and provocative military actions 
in recent years, arguably to play to domestic audiences, but these contradict other, more conciliatory 
gestures and help to intensify security dilemma dynamics between the two countries.
315
 
International credibility is also critical to alliance maintenance, and the US’s history of expanding 
alliance commitments arguably force it to act more like a non-status quo power; it needs to maintain 
offensive capabilities in the event it needs to go to the aid of an ally, and simultaneously tends to 
define its national interests in a more expansive way as a result.
316
  
The last, and potentially most interesting, psychological regulator is the extent to which the 
space powers’ policies and actions reflect ‘doctrinal [offensive] realism’.317 Doctrinal realism, or 
the widely held view in military circles that militarisation is inevitable and must be planned for, has 
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been particularly strong in the US. As a result, space has been viewed largely through a military 
lens, resulting in zero-sum paradigm security thinking and worse-case scenario planning.
318
  
Doctrinal debates in the US military have affected the views of other states since at least the 
beginning of the Cold War, but doctrinal realism has spread since the end of the Cold War and 
emergence of the unipolar world order.
 319
 
CONCLUSIONS  
In conclusion, the politics of space militarisation and arms control represent a security 
dilemma, albeit one that has not – at least not yet – driven states into open conflict. Importantly, 
there have been two periods where a security dilemma was not present due to revisionist intentions; 
the Reagan and George W. Bush presidencies reflected an expansion of national security interests to 
such an extent the US was effectively ‘malign’. A range of material and psychological regulators 
have influenced the intensity of the security dilemma over time. The offensive advantage of space 
weapons and difficulty of distinguishing between offensive and defensive space technologies have 
always been significant intensifying factors, but their effects were moderated somewhat by 
international governance, geography and bipolarity for much of the Cold War. However, as the 
space age progressed, the dilemma has become at least moderately acute; international governance 
has weakened, asymmetry increased, and the politics of space become more securitised.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 “You should know, then, that there are two means of contending: one by using laws, the other, 
force. The first is appropriate for men, the second for animals; but because the former is often 
ineffective, one must have recourse to the latter” 
Niccolò Machiavelli
320
 
 
 
The discussion above makes it possible to arrive at a number of conclusions. Firstly, the 
history of space militarisation and arms control can be characterised by five elements; the historical 
restraint of space powers regarding space weapons; accelerating militarisation; the continued central 
role of key space power states, particularly the US; the ambiguity of space technology; and states’ 
growing vulnerability to offensive uses of space technology.  
Secondly, the two most prominent explanations for the absence of a prohibition on space 
weapons provide some insights, but are ultimately unsatisfactory at explaining the major 
characteristics of the history of space arms control.  
Thirdly, the history of space militarisation and arms control has reflected the existence of a 
security dilemma between key space power states, and it is as a result of security dilemma 
dynamics that the failure of states to agree on a prohibition on space weapons is best understood. 
This dilemma was managed for the most part reasonably well by the Cold War superpowers, with 
the arguable exception of the period of the Reagan administration, but grew more intense from 1991 
in the face of unipolarity. From 2001 to 2008 the security dilemma was for all practical purposes 
suspended as US space policy became expansionist to the point that it was arguably no longer a 
‘defensive realist’ state – a precondition for the security dilemma.  
Fourthly, certain material and psychological regulators of the security dilemma have been 
particularly relevant to the difficulty of establishing a regime that would ban space weapons. These 
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are: the offensive advantage of space weapons; the difficulty in distinguishing between offensive 
and defensive space weapons; the legacy of historical distrust between the US and the USSR/Russia 
and China; the spread of ‘doctrinal realism’ from the US military to its politicians and other state 
decision-makers; and the increasing ‘securitisation’ of space politics.   
Fifthly, the fact that the international politics of space weaponisation reflects a security 
dilemma offers valuable insights for states concerned with space security and negotiators aiming to 
conclude an international prohibition on space weaponisation. They highlight the importance of 
‘security dilemma sensitivity’; an awareness by states that the moves they take to improve their 
security in, from and to space may cause uncertainty and even fear in other states. They also 
demonstrate the potential benefit of focusing efforts on certain regulators of the security dilemma to 
reduce the fear and uncertainty that can make the security dilemma acute.  
Sixthly, the involvement of the US in any regime that regulates space militarisation would 
be critical to the success of that regime. Space militarisation has been largely driven by a 
combination of the US military and responses to US moves by other states.  
Lastly, the example of space militarisation and weaponisation proves the usefulness of a 
comprehensive definition of the concept of the security dilemma. It also demonstrates the utility in 
understanding the role that the security dilemma can – but does not always – play in leading states 
to conflict.   
These conclusions identify a number of potentially rewarding avenues for future research. 
These include: the relationship of the space arms control security dilemma to other prominent 
military challenges, such as cyber warfare and nuclear deterrence; how interaction between decision 
makers within key space power states – particularly the military and legislative branches – drives 
and is driven by space security dilemma considerations; and the role that commercial entities will 
play in the politics of space arms control as their influence in space politics increases.  
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